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Abstract Modal dependence logics are modal logics defined on the basis of
team semantics and have the downward closure property. In this paper, we in-
troduce sound and complete deduction systems for the major modal dependence
logics, especially those with intuitionistic connectives in their languages. We
also establish a concrete connection between team semantics and single-world
semantics, and show that modal dependence logics can be interpreted as variants
of intuitionistic modal logics.
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Dependence logic is a logical formalism, introduced by Väänänen [28], that cap-
tures the notion of dependence in social and natural sciences. The modal version of
the logic is calledmodal dependence logic and was introduced in [29]. Modal depen-
dence logic extends the usual modal logic by adding a new type of atomic formulas
=(p1, . . . , p1,q), called dependence atoms, to express dependencies between proposi-
tions, and by lifting the usual single-world semantics to the so-called team semantics,
introduced by Hodges [13, 14]. Formulas of modal dependence logic are evaluated
on sets of possible worlds of Kripke models, called teams. Intuitively, a dependence
atom =(p1, . . . , p1,q) is true if within a team the truth value of the proposition q is
functionally determined by the truth values of the propositions p1, . . . , pn.
Research on modal dependence logic and its variants has been active in recent
years. Basic model-theoretic properties of the logics were studied in e.g., [26], a van
Benthem Theorem for the logics was proved in [16], and the frame definability of the
logics was studied in [24, 25]. The expressive power and the relevant computation
complexity problems of the logics were investigated extensively in e.g., [7, 8, 9, 12,
19, 20, 26]. In this paper, we study two problems that received less attention in
the literature, namely the axiomatization problem and the comparison between team
semantics and the single-world semantics.
1
2For the axiomatization problem, Sano and Virtema gave in [23] Hilbert-style sys-
tems and label tableau calculi for modal dependence logic and its extended version,
and Hannula defined in [11] natural deduction systems for the same logics. However,
these axiomatizations did not cover the modal dependence logics with intuitionistic
connectives of team semantics, especially with intuitionistic implication. The intu-
itionistic connectives of team semantics are crucial connectives of inquisitive logic
[6], a closely related logic to dependence logic that adopts (independently) team
semantics too (see e.g. [4, 33] for further discussions on the connection). While in-
quisitive modal logic has been axiomatized in [5], the logic has different modalities
and slightly different Kripke models than those of modal dependence logics. In this
paper, we define Hilbert and natural deduction systems for modal dependence logic
extended with intuitionistic disjunction and implication, called full modal downward
closed team logic (MT0). These systems are extensions of the systems of Fischer
Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic (IK) [10] and inquisitive (propositional) logic InqL
[6]. We also introduce deduction systems for modal intuitionistic dependence logic,
modal dependence logic with intuitionistic disjunction, and (extended) modal depen-
dence logic (MD) as fragments or variants of the system of MT0. We adopt the rules
for (extended) dependence atoms introduced in [33]. These rules are simpler than
those in the systems of [11, 23]. We also point out that for the logic MD, which
does not have implication in its language, the deduction system that enjoys (weak)
completeness can have less rules than the system that enjoys strong completeness.
This interesting difference between the validity problem (i.e., determining whether
|= φ) and the entailment problem (i.e., determining whether φ |= ψ) in MD was noted
also in [11].
Our axiomatizations make use of the disjunctive normal form of modal depen-
dence logics, which is essentially known in the literature. We apply this normal form
to prove a characterization theorem for flat formulas, the Interpolation Theorem and
the Finite Model Property of modal dependence logics.
For the second topic of this paper, it is well-known that the team-based first-
order dependence logic can be translated into the single-assignment-based existen-
tial second-order logic [28, 17]. In a similar fashion, we show in this paper that
the team-based modal dependence logics can be interpreted as certain single-world-
based intermediate modal logics. We first provide a rigorous proof for a seemingly
folklore observation in the field that clarifies the natural connection between team
semantics and single-world semantics in the modal case, namely, the team semantics
of modal dependence logics over a (classical) modal Kripke modelM coincides with
the usual single-world semantics over an intuitionistic Kripke model whose domain
consists of all teams ofM (i.e., the domain is the powerset ofM) and whose partial
order is the superset relation between teams. The tensor (disjunction) connective of
team semantics will be interpreted in this setting as a binary diamondmodality under
the single-world semantics, the idea of which is developed from [1], where tensor is
understood as a multiplicative conjunction.
On the basis of the powerset models, we establish a comparison between modal
dependence logics and familiar single-world-based non-classical logics, especially
intuitionistic modal logic and intermediate logics. We show that modal dependence
logics are complete (in the usual single-world semantics sense) with respect to a class
of bi-relation or tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke models that generalise the powerset
models. The bi-relation models are special bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models of
3Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic IK, and the tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke
models are endowed with an extra ternary relation interpreting the binary diamond
that corresponds to the tensor. Our results generalise the results in [3] that inquisitive
logic InqL can be viewed as a variant of the Kreisel-Putnam intermediate logic (KP)
[18], and InqL is complete (in the usual single-world semantics sense) with respect
to the class of negative intuitionistic Kripke models of KP.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 recalls the basics of modal de-
pendence logics. In particular, we sketch the standard translation from modal depen-
dence logics into first-order dependence logics and derive the Compactness Theorem
for modal dependence logics without intuitionistic implication as a corollary. In Sec-
tion 2 we study the axiomatization problem for modal dependence logics, and also
prove a few metalogical properties of the logics, including the Interpolation Theorem
and the Finite Model Property. Section 3 provides single-world semantics interpre-
tation of modal dependence logics. In Section 4 we make concluding remarks.
Preliminary results of this paper were included in the author’s dissertation [32].
1 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the basics of modal dependence logics, which are modal
logics defined on the basis of team semantics.
Though team semantics is intended for the extension of (classical) modal logic
obtained by adding dependence atoms, for the sake of comparison, we start by defin-
ing the team semantics and fixing notations for the usual (classical) modal logic. Fix
a set Prop of propositional variables and denote its elements by p,q,r, . . . (possibly
with subscripts). Formulas of (classical) modal logic, also called classical (modal)
formulas, are defined recursively as:
α ::= p | ⊥ | ¬α | α∧α | α⊗α | α→ α | α | ^α
where ⊗ (called tensor) denotes the disjunction of classical modal logic, and the
implication→ is called intuitionistic implication for reasons that will become clear
in the sequel.
A (modal)Kripke frame is a coupleF= (W,R) consisting of a nonempty setW and
a binary relation R ⊆W ×W. Elements of W are called possible worlds or nodes or
points. A (modal) Kripke model is a tripleM = (W,R,V) such that (W,R) is a Kripke
frame and V : Prop→ ℘(W) is a valuation function. A set X ⊆W of possible worlds
is called a team. For any team X, define R(X) = {w ∈W | ∃v ∈ X s.t. vRw} and write
R(w) for R({w}). A team Y is called a successor team of X, written XRY, if Y ⊆ R(X)
and Y ∩R(w) , ∅ for every w ∈ X.
Definition 1.1 We define inductively the notion of a classical modal formula α
being satisfied in a Kripke modelM = (W,R,V) on a team X ⊆W, denotedM,X |= α,
as follows:
• M,X |= p iff X ⊆ V(p)
• M,X |= ⊥ iff X = ∅
• M,X |= ¬φ iffM, {w} 6|= φ for all w ∈ X.
In particular,M,X |= ¬p iff X∩V(p) = ∅
• M,X |= φ∧ψ iffM,X |= φ andM,X |= ψ
• M,X |= φ⊗ψ iff there exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that X = Y∪Z,M,Y |= φ andM,Z |=ψ
• M,X |= φ→ ψ iff for all Y ⊆ X,M,Y |= φ impliesM,Y |= ψ
4• M,X |= φ iffM,R(X) |= φ
• M,X |= ^φ iff there exists Y ⊆W such that XRY andM,Y |= φ
For any Kripke modelM = (W,R,V), ifM,X |= φ holds for all X ⊆W, then we say
that φ is true on M and write M |= φ. For any Kripke frame F, if (F,V) |= φ holds
for all valuations V on F, then we say that φ is valid on F and write F |= φ. If F |= φ
holds for all frames F, then we say that φ is valid and write |= φ. We write Γ |= φ if
for all Kripke models M and all teams X, M,X |= γ for all γ ∈ Γ implies M,X |= φ.
We write simply φ |= ψ for {φ} |= ψ, and write φ ≡ ψ if φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ.
It is easy to check that classical modal formulas α satisfy the flatness property:
Flatness Property: M,X |= α⇐⇒ M, {w} |= α for all w ∈ X
⇐⇒ M,w |= α in the usual sense for all w ∈ X
As a consequence, a few usual equivalences, such as the following ones, hold for
classical formulas:
¬α ≡ α→⊥, α⊗β ≡ ¬α→ β and ^α ≡ ¬¬α.
Recall that the Hilbert-style system of classical modal logic K consists of the
following axioms and rules:
Axioms:
1. all axioms of classical propositional logic
2. (α→ β)→ (α→ β)
3. ^α↔¬¬α
Rules:
1. Modus Ponens: α,α→ β/β
2. Necessitation: α/α
3. Uniform Substitution: α/α(β/p)
For classical formulas, the system of K is sound and complete with respect to all
Kripke frames in the sense of team semantics too. To see why, by the Complete-
ness Theorem of K with respect to the usual single-world semantics and the flatness
property of classical formulas, we have
⊢K α ⇐⇒ M,w |= α for any modelM and any possible world w inM
⇐⇒ M, {w} |= α for any modelM and any possible world w inM
⇐⇒ M,X |= α for any modelM and any team X ofM
⇐⇒ |= α.
As a consequence, we also have
α ⊢K β ⇐⇒ ⊢K α→ β ⇐⇒ |= α→ β ⇐⇒ α |= β. (1)
In view of the flatness property, lifting the single-possible world semantics to team
semantics does not add essentially new features to classical modal formulas. Let us
now extend classical modal logic by adding the dependence atoms =(α1, . . . ,αn,β)
and intuitionistic disjunction∨ that violate the flatness property. We call the resulting
logic full modal downward closed team logic (MT0) and its language is defined
formaly as follows:
φ ::= α | =(α1, . . . ,αn,β) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ∨φ | φ→ φ | φ | ^φ,
where α,α1, . . . ,αn,β are classical modal formulas. We write ¬φ for φ→⊥.
5Definition 1.2 The satisfaction relation for MT0-formulas is defined as for clas-
sical modal formulas and additionally:
• M,X |= =(α1, · · · ,αn,β) iff for any w,u ∈ X, M,w |= αi ⇔ M,u |= αi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n impliesM,w |= β⇔M,u |= β.
• M,X |= φ∨ψ iffM,X |= φ orM,X |= ψ
Immediately from the semantics it follows that MT0-formulas have the downward
closure property and the empty team property defined below:
Downward Closure Property: [M,X |= φ and Y ⊆ X ] =⇒M,Y |= φ
Empty Team Property: M,∅ |= φ
We have discussed that the classical fragment of MT0 (i.e., the fragment consist-
ing of classical formals only) behaves exactly as classical modal logic. MT0 also
inherits from classical modal logic many other nice properties, such as the preserva-
tion property under taking disjoint unions. For any two Kripke modelsM = (W,R,V)
andM′ = (W′,R′,V′), their disjoint unionM⊎M′ = (W0,R0,V0) is defined as
W0 =W ⊎W
′, R0 = R⊎R
′ and V0(p) = V(p)⊎V′(p) for all p ∈ Prop,
where ⊎ takes the disjoint union of two sets. It can be proved by a routine argument
that for any collection {Mi = (Wi,Ri,Vi) | i ∈ I} of Kripke models, for every i ∈ I and
every X ⊆Wi,
Mi,X |= φ ⇐⇒
⊎
j∈I
M j,X |= φ. (2)
From this it follows that that MT0 has the disjunction property with respect to the
intuitionistic disjunction ∨, as shown below.
Theorem 1.3 (Disjunction Property) If |= φ∨ψ, then |= φ or |= ψ.
Proof SupposeM0,X 6|= φ andM1,Y 6|= ψ for some modelsM0 andM1 and teams
X and Y. LetM =M0⊎M1 and Z = X∪Y. By (2), we haveM,X 6|= φ andM,Y 6|= ψ.
Hence, by the downward closure property, M,Z 6|= φ and M,Z 6|= ψ, implying
M,Z 6|= φ∨ψ. ♣
In this paper, we also study some interesting fragments of MT0 (referred to as modal
dependence logics) defined by restricting the language as follows:
• The language of modal dependence logic (MD):
φ ::= α | =(p1, . . . , pn,q) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ | ^φ
where α is an arbitrary classical formula defined recursively as
α ::= p | ⊥ | ¬α | α∧α | α⊗α | α | ^α
• The language of extended modal dependence logic (MD+):
φ ::= α | =(α1, . . . ,αn,β) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ | ^φ
where α,α1, . . . ,αn,β are classical formulas defined as in the case of MD.
• The language of modal dependence logic with intuitionistic disjunction
(MD∨):
φ ::= α | =(α1, . . . ,αn,β) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ∨φ | φ | ^φ
where α,α1, . . . ,αn,β are classical formulas defined as in the case of MD.
6• The language of modal intuitionistic dependence logic (MID):
φ ::= α | ⊥ | =(α1, . . . ,αn,β) | φ∧φ | φ∨φ | φ→ φ | φ | ^φ
where α,α1, . . . ,αn,β are classical formulas defined recursively as
α ::= p | ⊥ | α∧α | α→ α | α | ^α
Note that negation is taken to be a defined connective, i.e., ¬φ := φ→ ⊥, in the
modal dependence logics that have implication in their languages (such as MT0 and
MID), while in the other logics (i.e., MD, MD+, MD∨, etc.) negation is a primitive
connective that applies to classical formulas only.
We leave it for the reader to check that in the presence of intuitionistic connectives
dependence atoms are definable, as
=(α1, . . . ,αk,β) ≡
(
(α1∨¬α1)∧ · · ·∧ (αk∨¬αk)→ (β∨¬β)
)
≡
⊗
v∈2{1,...,n}
(αv(1)1 ∧ · · ·∧α
v(n)
n ∧ (β∨¬β)) (3)
where 2 = {0,1}, γ1 = γ and γ0 = ¬γ. The modality-free fragments of MD, MD∨
and MID are called propositional dependence logic, propositional dependence logic
with intuitionistic disjunction and propositional intuitionistic dependence logic, re-
spectively. These propositional logics were studied in [33]. The modality and depen-
dence atom-free fragment of MID is in fact inquisitive (propositional) logic, which
was introduced by Ciardelli and Roelofsen in [6] and commented also in the context
of dependence logic in [4, 33, 32]. Ciardelli studied and axiomatized in [5] vari-
ous inquisitive modal logic obtained from inquisitive propositional logic by adding
different modalities than the  and ^ modalities we consider here in this paper.
The language of MD+ differs from that of MD only in that the dependence atoms
of the latter have only propositional arguments. In the literature, the terminology
dependence atoms is often used for dependence atoms =(p1, . . . , pn,q) with propo-
sitional arguments only, while dependence atoms =(α1, . . . ,αn,β) with classical ar-
guments are often referred to as extended dependence atoms. It is proved in [7, 12]
that MD is strictly less expressive than MD+, and the latter has the same expressive
power as MD∨.
An interesting feature of modal dependence logics is that they are not closed
under Uniform Substitution. For instance, |= ¬¬p → p and |= p ⊗ ¬p, whereas
6|= ¬¬(p∨¬p) → (p∨¬p) and 6|= (p∨¬p)⊗¬(p∨¬p). For this reason, none of
the deduction systems of modal dependence logics to be introduced in this paper
admits the uniform substitution rule. In fact, for these logics, substitution (being a
mapping from the set of well-formed formulas to the set itself that commutes with
the atoms, connectives and modalities) is not even a well-defined notion, because,
for instance, dependence atoms =(φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ) with arbitrary arguments are not
necessarily well-formed formulas of the logics. For more details on substitution in
dependence logics, we refer the reader to [5, 15].
The well-known standard translation from the usual (single-world-based) modal
logic into first-order logic provides interesting insights into the usual modal logic.
In particular, the Compactness Theorem of the usual modal logic is an immediate
consequence of the translation. Without going into further details we point out that a
similar translation from modal dependence logics into first-order dependence logics
can be defined as follows:
7• S Tx(p) := Px
• S Tx(⊥) := ⊥
• S Tx(¬α) := ¬S Tx(α)
• S Tx(=(α1, . . . ,αk,β)) := =(S Tx(α1), . . . ,S Tx(αk),S Tx(β))
• S Tx(φ∧ψ) := S Tx(φ)∧S Tx(ψ)
• S Tx(φ⊗ψ) := S Tx(φ)⊗S Tx(ψ)
• S Tx(φ∨ψ) := S Tx(φ)∨S Tx(ψ)
• S Tx(φ→ ψ) := S Tx(φ)→ S Tx(ψ)
• S Tx(φ) := ∀y(¬xRy⊗S Ty(φ))
• S Tx(^φ) := ∃y(xRy∧S Ty(φ))
where the extended dependence atom =(S Tx(α1), . . . ,S Tx(αk),S Tx(β)) and the intu-
itionistic disjunction ∨ can both be defined in first-order dependence logic in terms
of the other atoms and connectives1. A modal Kripke model M = (W,R,V) can be
associated in the usual manner with a first-order model M = (W,R, {PM}p∈Prop) by
interpreting the unary predicate symbols P as PM = V(p). A routine argument shows
that for everyMT0-formulaφ, for everyKripkemodelM= (W,R,V) and team X ⊆W,
M,X |= φ ⇐⇒ M |=Xx S Tx(φ), (4)
where Xx = {{(x,w)} | w ∈ X} is a first-order team with domain {x}.
Note that the formula S Tx(φ) is in general (equivalent to) a formula in the lan-
guage of first-order dependence logic extended with intuitionistic implication, which
is known to have the same expressive power as full second-order logic [31], and thus
not compact. But if φ does not contain intuitionistic implication, S Tx(φ) is (equiva-
lent to) a formula in the language of first-order (classical) dependence logic, which
has the same expressive power as the compact existential second-order logic [28].
We end this section by deriving the Compactness Theorem for modal dependence
logics without intuitionistic implication as a corollary of the standard translation.
Theorem 1.4 (Compactness) For any set Γ∪ {φ} of formulas in the language of
MD, MD+ or MD∨, if Γ |= φ, then there exists a finite set ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆ |= φ.
Proof By (4), we have Γ |= φ iff {S Tx(γ) | γ ∈ Γ} |= S Tx(φ). The theorem then
follows from the fact that first-order dependence logic is compact [28]. ♣
2 Axiomatizations
In this section, we introduce deduction systems for the modal dependence logics
defined in the previous section and prove the completeness theorems. Our systems
extend both the system of the propositional base of these logics, defined in [4, 33],
and the system of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic IK [10]. The systems
to be introduced in this section complement the previous axiomatizations [11, 23]
for modal dependence logics in two respects. First, we provide axiomatizations for
modal dependence logics with intuitionistic implication that have not yet been ax-
iomatized before. Second, we incorporate from [33] simpler rules for dependence
atoms, and our systems for the different logics exhibit more uniformity.
We introduce in Section 2.1 Hilbert-style and natural deduction systems for the
full logic MT0 and MID. For the other logics introduced in the previous section
that do not have implication in their languages, namely, MD∨, MD and MD+, we
only define natural deduction systems (which, unlike Hilbert-style systems, do not
necessarily use implications in the presentation). In Section 2.2, we show that the
8implication-free fragment of the natural deduction system of MT0 together with
some additional rules for negation and modalities form a complete system for MD∨.
The proofs of the completeness theorems in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 make heavy use of
a disjunctive normal form for these logics which can essentially be found in the liter-
ature. In Section 2.3, by using the normal form we prove a characterization theorem
for flat formulas, the Interpolation Theorem and the Finite Model Property of modal
dependence logics. In Section 2.4, we introduce the systems of MD and MD+ as
fragments of the system of MT0 together with some additional rules for dependence
atoms.
Note that for a logic that has an implication → in its language, if the Deduction
Theorem (i.e., Γ,φ |= ψ ⇐⇒ Γ |= φ→ ψ) holds for this implication, the entailment
problem and the validity problem can be reduced to each other, because
φ |= ψ ⇐⇒ |= φ→ ψ,
and as a consequence, assuming the compactness of the logic, the strong complete-
ness (i.e., Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ φ) of a deduction system of L is equivalent to its weak com-
pleteness (i.e., |= φ ⇐⇒ ⊢ φ). However, this is not in general true for logics without
an implication in their languages. To address this subtle point, we will present the
Completeness Theorems as
φ |= ψ ⇐⇒ φ ⊢ ψ,
especially for the implication-free logics MD∨, MD and MD+. We will see that
for the systems of MD and MD+ (which are compact by Theorem 1.4), there is
indeed a difference between the strong and the weak completeness: the systems for
which the weak completeness holds can have less rules than the ones for which the
strong completeness holds. This subtle difference was noted also in [11] in a different
system for MD+.
2.1 MT0 and MID In this subsection, we introduce sound and complete Hilbert-
style and natural deduction systems for MID and MT0. We first define the Hilbert-
style systems and prove the completeness theorems by an argument that makes essen-
tial use of the disjunctive normal form of the logics. The natural deduction systems
will be defined at the end of the section and their completeness follows from a similar
argument.
By Expression (3), dependence atoms are definable in MID. The dependence
atom-free fragment ofMID turns out to have inquisitive logic (InqL) [6] as its propo-
sitional base. Below we recall the Hilbert system of InqL defined in [5, 6]. We refer
the reader to [4, 33] for further discussion on the connection between inquisitive
logic and dependence logics.
Definition 2.1 The Hilbert-style system of inquisitive logic InqL is as follows:
Axioms:
1. all axiom schemes of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC), namely
(a) φ→ (ψ→ φ)
(b) (φ→ (ψ→ χ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
(c) φ∧ψ→ φ, φ∧ψ→ ψ
(d) φ→ (χ→ (φ∧χ))
(e) φ→ φ∨ψ, ψ→ φ∨ψ
(f) (φ→ χ)→ ((ψ→ χ)→ (φ∨ψ→ χ))
9(g) ⊥→ φ
2. (α→ (φ∨ψ))→ (α→ φ)∨ (α→ ψ) whenever α is a classical formula
3. ¬¬α→ α whenever α is a classical formula
Rule: Modus Ponens: φ,φ→ ψ/ψ
In the original presentation of the system of InqL as given in [6], axiom 2 is
formulated (equivalently) as any substitution instance of the KP axiom
(¬p→ (q∨ r))→ (¬p→ q)∨ (¬p→ r)
of the Kreisel-Putnam intermediate logic KP [18]. The system of InqL is then KP
without uniform substitution rule together with the Double Negation Law ¬¬α→ α
for classical formulas.
Our Hilbert-style systems of MT0 and MID will be extensions of both the system
of InqL and the system of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic (IK) [10]. We
refer the reader to [27] for further discussion on intuitionistic modal logic, and we
only remark that IK has intuitionistic propositional logic IPC as its propositional
base and adding the Law of Excluded Middle (i.e., φ∨¬φ) or the Double Negation
Law (i.e., ¬¬φ→ φ) to the logic gives rise to classical modal logic. In the literature
there are a few (equivalent) variants of the system of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic
modal logic IK. For the convenience of our argument, we use the system defined by
Plokin and Stirling [22], which we recall below.
Definition 2.2 The Hilbert-style system of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal
logic IK consists of the following axioms and rules:
Axioms:
1. all axioms of IPC
2. (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
3. (φ→ ψ)→ (^φ→ ^ψ)
4. ¬^⊥
5. ^(φ∨ψ)→ (^φ∨^ψ)
6. (^φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
Rules:
1. Modus Ponens: φ,φ→ ψ/ψ
2. Necessitation: φ/φ
3. Uniform Substitution: φ/φ(ψ/p)
Now, we present our Hilbert-style systems of MT0 and MID.
Definition 2.3 • The Hilbert-style system of MT0 is defined as follows:
Axioms:
1. all axioms of inquisitive logic InqL
2. all axiom schemes of IK
3. =(α1, . . . ,αk,β)↔
(
(α1∨¬α1)∧ · · ·∧ (αk ∨¬αk)→ (β∨¬β)
)
4. φ→ φ⊗ψ
5. (φ→ α)→
(
(ψ→ α)→ (φ⊗ψ→ α)
)
wheneverα is a classical formula
6. (φ→ χ)→
(
(ψ→ θ)→ (φ⊗ψ→ χ⊗ θ)
)
7. φ⊗ψ→ ψ⊗φ
8. φ⊗ (ψ⊗χ)→ (φ⊗ψ)⊗χ
9. φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)→ (φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ)
10. ¬α→^¬α whenever α is a classical formula
11. (φ∨ψ)→ (φ∨ψ)
Rules:
1. Modus Ponens: φ,φ→ ψ/ψ
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2. Necessitation: φ/φ
• The Hilbert-style system of MID consists of all of the axioms and rules of
the above system of MT0 except the axioms that involve ⊗ (i.e., axioms 4-9).
Hereafter within this section, we let L denote either MT0 or MID. The following
proposition lists some interesting derivable clauses that will play a role in the sequel.
Proposition 2.4 Let φ,ψ be L-formulas, and α,β classical formulas.
(a) φ⊗ (ψ∨χ) ⊣⊢MT0 (φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ)
(b) (φ∨ψ) ⊣⊢L φ∨ψ
(c) ^(φ∨ψ) ⊣⊢L ^φ∨^ψ
(d) ¬¬α ⊣⊢L α
(e) ^α ⊣⊢L ¬¬α
(f) ⊢MT0 α⊗¬α
Proof A routine proof. In particular, in order to derive item (e), one may first
derive from the IK axioms (φ→ ψ)→ (^φ→^ψ) and ¬^⊥ that ⊢IK ¬φ→¬^φ
for arbitrary formulas φ. ♣
Next, we prove the Soundness Theorem for the systems of MT0 and MID.
Theorem 2.5 (Soundness) For any L-formulas φ and ψ, φ ⊢L ψ =⇒ φ |= ψ.
Proof It suffices to show that all the axioms of MT0 are valid and all the rules are
sound. We only verify the validity of axiom 2 of InqL and axiom 10.
Axiom 2 of InqL: We prove a slightly more general fact that
θ→ (φ∨ψ) |= (θ→ φ)∨ (θ→ ψ) whenever θ is flat. (5)
Suppose M,X 6|= (θ→ φ)∨ (θ→ ψ). Then M,X 6|= θ → φ and M,X 6|= θ → ψ. Thus,
there exist Y,Z ⊆ X such that
M,Y |= θ, M,Z |= θ, M,Y 6|= φ and M,Z 6|= ψ.
Since θ is flat and L has the downward closure property, we have
M,Y ∪Z |= θ, M,Y ∪Z 6|= φ and M,Y ∪Z 6|= ψ.
Hence,M,X 6|= θ→ (φ∨ψ).
Axiom 10: Suppose M,X |= ¬α, where M = (W,R,V) and α is a classical for-
mula. Then, for any w ∈ X, we haveM, {w} 6|= α, i.e. M,R(w) 6|= α. Since α is flat,
there exists vw ∈ R(w) such thatM, {vw} 6|= α. Define Y = {vw ∈ R(X) | w ∈ X}. Clearly,
XRY andM,Y |= ¬α. Hence,M,X |= ^¬α. ♣
To prove the Completeness Theorem for MT0 and MID, we will transform every
formula into a formula in disjunctive normal form:
α1∨ · · ·∨αn (6)
where each αi is a classical formula. This normal form is a generalization of a
similar normal form for InqL defined in [5, 6], and similar disjunctive normal forms
for modal dependence logics without intuitionistic implication were discussed in
the literature with a slightly different presentation (see e.g., [12, 19]). Let us now
introduce our disjunctive normal form for MT0 as a recursively defined translation
τ(φ) for every formula φ of MT0:
Base case:
• τ(α) = α when α is a classical formula
• τ(=(α1, . . . ,αk,β)) := τ((α1∨¬α1)∧ · · ·∧ (αk∨¬αk)→ (β∨¬β))
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Induction step:
Assume τ(ψ) = α1 ∨ · · · ∨αn and τ(χ) = β1 ∨ · · · ∨βm, where αi and β j are
classical formulas.
• τ(ψ∨χ) := τ(ψ)∨τ(χ)
• τ(ψ∧χ) :=
∨
{αi ∧β j) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
• τ(ψ⊗χ) :=
∨
{αi ⊗β j | 1 ≤ i ≤ n,1 ≤ j ≤ m}
• τ(ψ→ χ) =
∨
{
∧n
i=1(αi → β f (i)) | f : {1, . . . ,n} → {1, . . . ,m}}
• τ(^ψ) :=
∨
{^αi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
• τ(ψ) :=
∨
{αi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
The disjunctive normal form for MID is defined the same way as above except that
MID does not have the connective ⊗ in its language. In the next theorem, we show
that every formula is provably equivalent to its disjunctive normal form.
Theorem 2.6 (Normal Form) For any L-formula φ, we have ⊢L φ↔ τ(φ).
Proof We only give the proof for MT0, from which the MID case follows.
We proceed by induction on φ. The base case is trivial. For the induction step, the
cases φ = ψ∨χ and φ = ψ∧χ follow immediately from the induction hypothesis and
IPC axioms. The cases φ = ψ and φ = ^ψ follow from Proposition 2.4(b)(c).
If φ = ψ⊗ χ, then by the induction hypothesis, we derive in the system of MT0
using axiom 6 and Proposition 2.4(a) that
ψ⊗χ ⊣⊢
( n∨
i=1
αi
)
⊗
( m∨
j=1
β j
)
⊣⊢
n∨
i=1
m∨
j=1
(αi ⊗β j).
If φ = ψ→ χ, then by the induction hypothesis, we derive in the system of MT0
using axiom 2 of InqL and IPC axioms that
ψ→ χ ⊣⊢
( n∨
i=1
αi
)
→
( m∨
j=1
β j
)
⊣⊢
n∧
i=1
(
αi →
m∨
j=1
β j
)
⊣⊢
n∧
i=1
m∨
j=1
(αi → β j)
⊣⊢
∨
{
n∧
i=1
(αi → β f (i)) | f : {1, . . . ,n} → {1, . . . ,m}}.
♣
Each disjunct αi in the disjunctive normal form
∨
i∈I αi is a classical formula. We
now show that MT0 and MID derive the same entailment relation as K does.
Lemma 2.7 If α and β are classical formulas, then α ⊢K β ⇐⇒ α ⊢L β.
Proof For the direction “⇐=”, suppose α ⊢L β. By the Soundness Theorem, we
have α |= β, which by Expression (1) from Section 1 implies α ⊢K β.
For the direction “=⇒", by Proposition 2.4(e) and by inspecting the axioms and
rules, we see easily that restricted to classical formulas, the systems of MT0 and
MID admit all K rules and axioms, including Uniform Substitution rule, the axiom
^α↔¬¬α, the double negation axiom ¬¬α→ α and all classical axioms of dis-
junction with respect to tensor ⊗. This implies that any classical entailment relation
α ⊢ β that is derivable in K is also derivable (by the same derivation) in L. ♣
We are now ready to prove the Completeness Theorem for the two systems.
Theorem 2.8 (Completeness) For any L-formulas φ and ψ, φ |= ψ =⇒ φ ⊢L ψ.
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Proof Suppose φ |= ψ. By Lemma 2.6, φ ⊣⊢L α1 ∨ · · · ∨αk and ψ ⊣⊢L β1∨ · · · ∨βm,
for some classical formulas αi and β j. By the Soundness Theorem, we have
α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αk |= β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βm, which implies αi |= β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βm for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since αi is flat, it follows from Expression (5) that αi |= β ji for some 1 ≤ ji ≤ m. We
then derive by applying Expression (1) from Section 1 that αi ⊢K β ji , which yields
αi ⊢L β ji by Lemma 2.7. Hence, α1∨ · · ·∨αk ⊢L β1∨ · · ·∨βm, which gives φ ⊢L ψ. ♣
Having proved the Completeness Theorem for the Hilbert-style systems of MT0 and
MID, we now present also natural deduction systems of the logics.
Definition 2.9 • The natural deduction system of MT0 is defined as follows:
Axiom: Ax¬^⊥
Rules: All rules in Table 1.
• The natural deduction system MID consists of all the axioms and rules of the
system of MT0 except for the rules that involve ⊗, i.e., the rules in Table 1(d)
and the first distributive rule in Table 1(c).
The rules for the propositional base of MT0 and MID are adapted from those
introduced for PD∨ in [33] and for QDP in [4], and the rules for modalities are
obvious translations of the axioms for the logics in the Hilbert-style systems of Def-
inition 2.3. The rule Mon with empty assumption corresponds to the Hilbert-style
Necessitation Rule. It is easy to verify that the systems defined in Definition 2.9 are
sound. The completeness of the systems can be proved by a similar argument (via
the disjunctive normal form) to what we presented above. We will not provide the
proof here. However, in the next section, we will prove that a sound and complete
natural deduction system of the logic MD∨ (a fragment of MT0) can be obtained by
dropping the inapplicable rules in Definition 2.9 and adding certain additional rules.
2.2 MD∨ In this section, we introduce a sound and complete natural deduction
system for MD∨, the implication-free fragment of MT0.
Definition 2.10 The natural deduction system of MD∨ consists of all rules in
Table 1(b)-(e), together with the additional rules in Table 2.
The system of MD∨ has all the rules of MT0 that do not involve implication, to-
gether with some additional rules for negation and modalities. The clauses in Propo-
sition 2.4 are derivable easily also in the system of MD∨. In particular, item (e)
(^α ⊣⊢L ¬¬α) can be derived without applying the IK axiom ¬^⊥ as follows:
^α
[α] [¬α]
¬E
⊥
¬I¬¬α
^Mon
^¬¬α
Inter^¬¬α
¬¬α
Inter^
^¬¬α
[¬¬α]
¬¬Eα
^Mon
^α
(7)
Note that we did not include the IK axiom ¬^⊥ in our system of MD∨, because this
classical formula is derivable in the system:
[⊥]
¬I
¬⊥
Mon
¬⊥ Proposition 2.4(d)
¬¬¬⊥ Proposition 2.4(e)
¬^⊥
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(a)
[φ]
...
ψ
→ I
φ→ ψ
φ φ→ ψ
→ E
ψ
α→ (φ∨ψ)
Split
(α→ φ)∨ (α→ ψ)
(φ→ ψ)
φ→ ψ
(φ→ ψ)
^φ→^ψ
^φ→ ψ
(φ→ ψ)
(b)
φ ψ
∧I
φ∧ψ
φ∧ψ
∧E
φ
φ∧ψ
∧E
ψ
¬¬α
¬¬Eα
⊥
Ex falso
φ
[φ1] . . . [φk]
D∗
ψ φ1 . . . φk
Mon
ψ
¬α
Inter^
^¬α
(∗) The derivation D is assumed to have no undischarged assumptions.
(c)
φ
∨I
φ∨ψ
ψ
∨I
φ∨ψ
[φ]
...
χ
[ψ]
...
χ φ∨ψ
∨Eχ
φ⊗ (ψ∨χ)
Dstr⊗∨(φ⊗ψ)∨ (φ⊗χ)
^(φ∨ψ)
Distr^∨
^φ∨^ψ
(φ∨ψ)
Distr∨
φ∨ψ
(d)
φ
⊗I
φ⊗ψ
[φ]
...
α
[ψ]
...
α φ⊗ψ
⊗Eα
[ψ]
...
χ φ⊗ψ
⊗Sub
φ⊗χ
φ⊗ψ
Com⊗
ψ⊗φ
φ⊗ (ψ⊗χ)
Ass⊗
(φ⊗ψ)⊗χ
(e)
=(α1, . . . ,αk,β)
=(·)df⊗
v∈2{1,...,k}
(αv(1)1 ∧ · · ·∧α
v(k)
k
∧ (β∨¬β))
Table 1 Rules of the system of MT0. Hereafter in the tables α,β,α1, . . . ,αk . . . range
over classical formulas, and α1
i
:= αi and α0i := ¬αi for each i.
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[α]
...
⊥
¬I¬α
α ¬α
¬E
⊥
[φ]
D∗
...
ψ ^φ
^Mon
^ψ
^¬α
Inter^
¬α
(∗) The derivation D is assumed to have no undischarged assumptions.
Table 2 Rules for negation and modalities
To prove the Completeness Theorem of the system, we adopt a very similar ar-
gument to that in the previous section. We first show that every MD∨-formula is
provably equivalent to a formula in disjunctive normal form.
Lemma 2.11 (Normal Form) For any MD∨-formula φ, φ ⊣⊢
∨
i∈I αi for some set
{αi | i ∈ I} of classical formulas.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on φ. If φ is a classical formula, then the
lemma holds trivially. If φ = =(α1, . . . ,αn,β), then we derive
=(α1, . . . ,αn,β) ⊣⊢
⊗
v∈2{1,...,n}
(αv(1)1 ∧ · · ·∧α
v(n)
n ∧ (β∨¬β)) (by =(·)df)
⊣⊢
∨
f∈22{1,...,n}
⊗
v∈2{1,...,n}
(αv(1)1 ∧ · · ·∧α
v(n)
n ∧β
f (v))
(by Proposition 2.4(a)).
The induction steps are proved by applying Proposition 2.4(a)-(c) and the induc-
tion hypothesis (cf. the proof of Theorem 2.6). ♣
Lemma 2.12 If α and β are classical formulas, then α ⊢K β ⇐⇒ α ⊢MD∨ β.
Proof The direction “⇐=” then follows from the Soundness Theorem and Expres-
sion (1) from Section 1.
For the direction “=⇒”, it suffices to show that restricted to classical formulas, the
system of MD∨ admits all axioms and rules of the Hilbert-style system of K.
For the rules of K, by inspecting the rules of the system of MD∨, we see that
restricted to classical formulas, the system admits Uniform Substitution rule, and
Necessitation rule is a special case of the rule Mon when there is no undischarged
assumption in the rule. The Modus Ponens rule is interpreted as α,¬α⊗ β/β in the
language of MD∨ and it can be derived as follows:
α [¬α]
¬E
⊥
Ex falso
β ¬α⊗β
⊗Sub
β⊗β
⊗E
β
For the propositional axioms of K, it is easy to see that restricted to classical for-
mulas, the system of MD∨ contains all the rules for the classical propositional con-
nectives conjunction, disjunction with respect to ⊗, negation and falsum ⊥. There-
fore all axioms of classical propositional logic are derivable in the system of MD∨.
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For the axioms of K that involve modalities, the validity of (an equivalent form
of) the K axiom is stated in the language of MD∨ as (α∧β) ⊣⊢ α∧β, which can
be derived easily by applying Mon. Finally, we derived the inter-definability of 
and ^, i.e., ^α ⊣⊢ ¬¬α, already in (7). ♣
Theorem 2.13 (Completeness) For anyMD∨-formulas φ and ψ, φ |=ψ ⇐⇒ φ ⊢MD∨ ψ.
Proof By a similar argument to that of the proof of Theorem 2.8, where we apply
Lemmas 2.11 and 2.12 instead. ♣
Since MD∨ is compact (by Theorem 1.4), we obtain also the Strong Completeness
Theorem as a corollary.
Corollary 2.14 (Strong Completeness) For any set Γ∪ {φ} of MD∨-formulas,
Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢MD∨ φ.
2.3 Applications of the disjunctive normal form We devote this section to three in-
teresting applications of the disjunctive normal form (6) of modal dependence logics.
In the context of propositional logics of dependence, flat formulas admit a certain
characterization theorem; see [5, 15] for the proof. We now generalize this charac-
terization result to the modal case by using the disjunctive normal form.
Theorem 2.15 The following are equivalent.
(a) φ is flat
(b) φ ≡ α for some classical formula α
(c) ¬¬φ ≡ φ
(d) |= φ⊗¬φ
Proof We only give the detailed proof for (a)⇒(b). Assume (a). We have
φ≡
∨
i∈I αi for some set {αi | i ∈ I} of classical formulas, and in particular |= φ→
∨
i∈I αi.
Since φ is flat, it follows from Expression (5) from Section 2.1 and the Disjunction
Property (Theorem 1.3) that there exists j ∈ I such that φ |= α j. On the other hand,
α j |=
∨
i∈I αi. Hence, φ ≡ α j. ♣
We write φ(~p) to indicate that the propositional variables occurring in φ are among
~p = p1 . . . pn. Next, we prove Craig’s Interpolation Theorem for modal dependence
logics that have intuitionistic disjunction in their languages.
Theorem 2.16 (Interpolation) Let L be a modal dependence logic that has intu-
itionistic disjunction in its language. For any L-formulas φ(~p,~q) and ψ(~q,~r), if φ ⊢L ψ,
then there exists an L-formula θ(~q) such that φ ⊢L θ and θ ⊢L ψ.
Proof Suppose φ(~p,~q) ⊢L ψ(~q,~r). Then
∨
i∈I αi ⊣⊢ φ ⊢ ψ ⊣⊢
∨
j∈J β j for some sets
{αi(~p,~q) | i ∈ I} and {β j(~q,~r) | j ∈ J} of classical formulas. Then, for each i ∈ I,
there exists ji ∈ J such that αi ⊢L β ji . Since αi and β ji are classical formulas,
αi(~p,~q) ⊢K β ji (~q,~r). Now, by the Interpolation Theorem of K, there exists a classical
formula θi(~q) such that αi(~p,~q) ⊢K θi(~q) and θi(~q) ⊢K β ji(~q,~r). Thus, αi(~p,~q) ⊢L θi(~q)
and θi(~q) ⊢L β ji (~q,~r). The formula
∨
i∈I θi(~q) is in the language of L, and clearly∨
i∈I αi(~p,~q) ⊢L
∨
i∈I θi(~q) and
∨
i∈I θi(~q) ⊢L
∨
j∈J β j. ♣
Lastly, we prove that modal dependence logics have the finite model property.
Theorem 2.17 (Finite Model Property) If 6|= φ, then there exists a finite Kripke
modelM and finite team X such thatM,X 6|= φ.
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Proof For any formula φ, we have φ ≡
∨
i∈I αi for some finite set {αi | i ∈ I} of
classical formulas. If 6|= φ, then 6|= αi for all i ∈ I. Since each αi is a classical formula,
by Expression (1) from Section 1, 0K αi for each i ∈ I. By the finite model property
of K, for each i ∈ I, there exists a finite Kripke modelMi and wi such thatMi,wi 6|= αi.
It follows thatMi, {wi} 6|= αi in the sense of team semantics. Consider the finite model
M =
⊎
i∈IMi and the finite team X = {wi | i ∈ I}. By Expression (2) from Section 1,
we obtain that for each i ∈ I,M, {wi} 6|= αi, which impliesM,X 6|= αi by the downward
closure property. Hence, we conclude thatM,X 6|=
∨
i∈I αi, therebyM,X 6|= φ. ♣
2.4 MD and MD+ In this section, we define natural deduction systems for MD and
MD+. As we pointed out in the introduction of Section 2, in these implication-free
logics (which are compact by Theorem 1.4) there is a subtle difference between the
weak and the strong completeness. We first introduce the systems for the two logics
for which the strong completeness holds, and then point out that the systems with
two rules less already admit the weak completeness.
The systems of MD and MD+ have (essentially) the same rules for (extended)
dependence atoms as introduced in [33]. To define these rules, let us follow [33]
and first introduce some notations. A formula in the language of MD+ or MD is a
finite string of symbols. We number the symbols in a formula with positive integers
starting from the left, as in the following example:
= (  p , q ) ⊗  = (  p , q )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
If the mth symbol of a formula φ starts a string ψ that is a subformula of φ, we
denote the subformula by [ψ,m]φ, or simply [ψ,m]. When referring to an occurrence
of a formula χ inside a subformula ψ of φ, we will be sloppy about the notations
and use the same counting also for the subformula ψ. We write φ(β/[α,m]) for the
formula obtained from φ by replacing the occurrence of the subformula [α,m] with
β. For example, for the formula φ = =(p,q)⊗ =(p,q), we denote the second
occurrence of the dependence atom =(p,q) by [=(p,q),10], and the same notation
also designates the occurrence of =(p,q) inside the subformula  =(p,q). The
notation φ(β/[=(p,q),10]) designates the formula =(p,q)⊗β.
Definition 2.18 • The natural deduction system of MD+ consists of the
rules in Table 1(b)(d), together with the rules in Table 3.
• The natural deduction system of MD is the same as that of MD+ except that
the dependence atoms can only have propositional variables as arguments.
In the above systems, the rules DepI0, DepE0 and SE for dependence atoms sim-
ulate the equivalence =(α) ≡ α∨¬α, and the rules DepIk and DepEk simulate the
equivalence =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) ≡ =(α1)∧ · · ·∧ =(αk)→ =(β) (see also Expression (3) in
Section 1). Clearly, DepE0 is a special case of SE, but we present both rules in Ta-
ble 3 for reasons that will become clear in the sequel. We refer the reader to [33] for
further discussion on these rules.
For simplicity, we only give the proof of the Completeness Theorem for the sys-
tem MD+, from which the Completeness Theorem for the system MD follows. We
follow the argument in [33] for propositional dependence logic, and first define re-
alizations of formulas, a crucial notion of the argument. Let d = =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) be
a dependence atom. A function f : 2{1,...,k} → 2 is called a realizing function for d,
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(a)
α DepI0
=(α)
¬α DepI0
=(α)
[=(α1)] . . . [=(αk)]
=(β)
DepIk
=(α1, . . . ,αk,β)
=(α)
[α]
...
θ
[¬α]
...
θ
DepE0θ
(b)
=(α1, . . . ,αk,β) =(α1) . . . =(αk)
DepEk
=(β)
[φ(α/[=(α),m])]
...
θ
[φ(¬α/[=(α),m])]
...
θ φ
SE
θ
Table 3 Rules for Dependence Atoms
where we stipulate 2∅ = {∅}, and the formula
d∗f :=
⊗
v∈2{1,...,k}
(
α
v(1)
1 ∧ · · ·∧α
v(k)
k
∧β f (v)
)
is called a realization of the dependence atom d over f . Let o= 〈[d1,m1], . . . , [dc,mc]〉
be the sequence of all occurrences of dependence atoms in φ. A realizing sequence
of φ is a sequence Ω = 〈 f1, . . . , fc〉 such that each fi is a realizing function for di. We
call the classical formula φ∗
Ω
defined as follows a realization of φ:
φ∗
〈 f1,..., fc〉
:= φ((d1)∗f1/[d1,m1], . . . , (dc)
∗
fc
/[dc,mc]).
For example, consider the formula φ= =(p,q)⊗ =(p,q) that we discussed earlier.
Consider two realizing functions f ,g : 2{1} → 2 for =(p,q), defined as
f (1) = 1 = f (0), g(1) = 0 and g(0) = 1,
where 1(1)= 1 and 0(1)= 0. Both 〈 f ,g〉 and 〈g, f 〉 are realizing sequences of φ giving
rise to two realizations
(
=(p,q)
)∗
f ⊗
(
=(p,q))
)∗
g =
(
(p∧q)⊗ (¬p∧q)
)
⊗
(
(p∧¬q)⊗ (¬p∧q)
)
and
(
=(p,q)
)∗
g ⊗
(
=(p,q))
)∗
f of φ.
The next lemma states the crucial properties of realizations that will be applied in
the proof of the Completeness Theorem.
Lemma 2.19 Let φ be a formula, and Λ the set of all realizing sequences of φ.
(a) φ∗
Ω
⊢MD+ φ for any Ω ∈ Λ.
(b) If φ∗
Ω
⊢MD+ ψ for all Ω ∈ Λ, then φ ⊢MD+ ψ.
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(c) φ ≡
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω
.
To prove item (a) of the above lemma, we first prove a technical lemma.
Lemma 2.20 Let ψ be a subformula of φ that is not inside the scope of a depen-
dence atom or a negation. If δ ⊢MD+ θ, then φ(δ/[ψ,m]) ⊢MD+ φ(θ/[ψ,m]).
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on the subformulas χ of φ.
The case when χ is an atom is trivial. If χ = χ0 ⊗ χ1 and without loss of
generality we assume that the formula [ψ,m] occurs in the subformula χ0. By
the induction hypothesis, χ0(δ/[ψ,m]) ⊢ χ0(θ/[ψ,m]), which by ⊗Sub implies
χ0(δ/[ψ,m])⊗χ1 ⊢ χ0(θ/[ψ,m])⊗χ1. The case χ = χ0∧χ1 is proved analogously.
The case χ = ^χ0 follows from the induction hypothesis and ^Mon, and the case
χ = χ0 follows from the induction hypothesis and Mon. ♣
Proof of Lemma 2.19 (a) We prove the item by induction on the complexity of φ.
If φ does not contain any occurrences of dependence atoms, then the property
holds trivially. If φ = =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) is a dependence atom and f : 2{1,...,k} → 2 a
realizing function of d = φ, by DepIk, to show d
∗
f
⊢ =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) it suffices to derive
d∗
f
, =(α1), . . . , =(αk) ⊢ =(β). This is proved by a similar argument to that of the proof
of Lemma 4.15 in [33] which makes use of the rules DepI0, DepE0 and DepIk.
If φ is a complex formula with c occurrences of dependence atoms, and
φ∗
〈 f1 ,..., fc〉
:= φ((d1)∗f1/[d1,m1], . . . , (dc)
∗
fc
/[dc,mc]), where Ω = 〈 f1, . . . , fc〉. Then,
since (di)∗fi ⊢ di for each 1 ≤ i ≤ c, we derive
φ((d1)∗f1/[d1,m1], . . . , (dc)
∗
fc
/[dc,mc]) ⊢ φ(d1/[d1,m1], . . . , (dc/[dc,mc])
by applying Lemma 2.20 repeatedly.
(b) This item is a special case of the statement of Lemma 4.18 in [33], and can be
proved by essentially the same argument that makes use of DepI0, DepEk, SE and
other rules of the system of MD+.
(c) The direction
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω
|= φ follows from item (a) and the Soundness Theorem.
We now prove the other direction φ |=
∨
Ω∈Λφ
∗
Ω
by induction on φ.
The case when φ is a dependence atom can be easily checked using Expression
(3) from Section 1. The other propositional cases can be proved easily by the same
argument as in Lemma 4.16 in [33]. The case when φ = ψ or φ = ^ψ follows from
the fact that (A∨B) |= A∨B and ^(A∨B) |= ^A∨^B. ♣
Theorem 2.21 (Completeness) For anyMD+-formula φ andψ, φ |=ψ ⇐⇒ φ ⊢MD+ ψ.
Proof Suppose φ |= ψ. By Lemma 2.19(c), we have
φ ≡
∨
Ω∈Λ
φ∗
Ω
|=
∨
∆∈Λ′
ψ∗
∆
≡ ψ
whereΛ andΛ′ are the (nonempty) sets of all realizing sequences of φ and ψ, respec-
tively. Since each φ∗
Ω
and ψ∗
∆
are classical formulas, by (5) from Section 2 we obtain
that for each Ω ∈ Λ, there is ∆ ∈ Λ′ such that φ∗
Ω
|= ψ∗
∆
. From (1) from Section 1 we
know that φ∗
Ω
⊢K ψ
∗
∆
, which implies φ∗
Ω
⊢MD+ ψ
∗
∆
by a similar argument to those in the
previous sections (Cf. Lemma 2.12). Now, by Lemma 2.19(a) we derive φ∗
Ω
⊢MD+ ψ.
Finally, by Lemma 2.19(b) we conclude that φ ⊢MD+ ψ. ♣
Since MD+ is compact (by Theorem 1.4), we obtain the strong completeness as a
corollary.
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Corollary 2.22 (Strong Completeness) For any set Γ∪ {φ} of MD+-formulas,
Γ |= φ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢MD∨ φ.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the theoremhood or validity problem of the
logic MD+ can actually be axiomatized by a slightly weaker system that contains
less rules than the one defined in Definition 2.18 for the entailment problem. In the
system of Definition 2.18, if we drop the rules in Table 3(b) and write ⊢0
MD+
φ if φ
is a theorem (i.e., a formula derivable from the empty assumption) in the resulting
system, items (a) and (b) of Lemma 2.19 are still true. By a very similar argument
to the proof of Theorem 2.21 (namely, simply discard the arguments that involve φ),
one can prove the following weaker form of Completeness Theorem for this weaker
system without applying Lemma 2.19(b).
Theorem 2.23 ((Weak) Completeness) For anyMD+-formula φ, |= φ ⇐⇒⊢0
MD+
φ.
3 Interpreting team semantics in single-world semantics
In the previous section, we have defined the systems of modal dependence logics as
extensions of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic modal logic IK and inquisitive logic InqL
(which is a variant of the Kreisel-Putnam intermediate logic KP). In this section, we
explore the connection between the single-world-based intuitionistic modal logic and
intermediate logics and modal dependence logics from the model-theoretic point of
view. We first prove that the team semantics of modal dependence logics over a
usual (modal) Kripke modelM coincides with the usual single-world semantics over
an intuitionistic Kripke model M′, whose domain consists of the teams of M. For
simplicity, we only perform this construction for the dependence atom-free fragment
of MID and MT0, denoted MID− and MT−0 , subsequently in Section 3.1 and Sec-
tion 3.2. Depending on whether tensor ⊗ is present in the language of the logic, the
domain of a model M′ for interpreting the team semantics will consist of either the
full powerset of the domain ofM or the same powerset excluding the empty set. The
tensor ⊗ (which corresponds to multiplicative conjunction, as discussed in [1], but is
often understood as a disjunction) will be naturally interpreted as a binary diamond
modality in this framework.
Furthermore, we generalize the properties of the specific powerset models we
built for interpreting team semantics to establish the connection on a general level.
In Section 3.1 we identify a class of bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models that
enjoy the abstract properties of the powerset models for MID−, and we show that
the system of MID− defined in the previous section2 is complete with respect to this
class of models in the single-world semantics sense. Similar result for MT−
0
will
be obtained in Section 3.2 with respect to a class of tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke
models with an extra ternary relation corresponding to the binary diamond ⊗. This
approach is based on a similar construction for inquisitive logic given in [3].
3.1 A single-world semantics for MID− In this section, we define a single-world
semantics for the system of the dependence atom-free fragment of MID (MID−).
Observe from Definition 2.3 that the set of theorems of MID− includes all theorems
of IK and is included in the set of theorems of K. In other words, MID− can be
understood as an intermediate modal logic3 that is not closed under uniform substi-
tution (also called an intermediate modal theory). To be more precise, MID− can
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Figure 1: Frame conditions. The directed lines represent the R relation and the undi-
rected lines represent the ≥ relation with the nodes positioned above being accessible
from the ones positioned below.
be viewed as the fusion of IK and KP together with one axiom stating that box dis-
tributes over disjunction (i.e., (φ∨ψ)→ (φ∨ψ)), and two axioms describing the
classical behavior of disjunction-free formulas (i.e., ¬α → ^¬α and ¬¬α → α).
Recall that IK is complete with respect to bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frames
(see e.g. [27]) and KP is complete with respect to KP-frames (see e.g. [2]). We will
show in this section that MID− is complete (in the single-world semantics sense)
with respect to a class of Kripke models whose frames are both bi-relation intuition-
istic Kripke frames and KP-frames.
Let us first recall relevant definitions for IK.
Definition 3.1 A bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame is a triple F = (W,≥,R),
where
• W is a nonempty set
• ≥ is a partial ordering and R is a binary relation onW
• R and ≥ satisfy the following two conditions (F1) and (F2) (see Figure 1):
F1: If w ≥ w′ and wRv, then there exists v′ ∈W such that v ≥ v′ and w′Rv′.
F2: If wRv and v ≥ v′, then there exists w′ ∈W such that w ≥ w′ and w′Rv′.
A bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke model is a quadruple M = (W,≥,R,V) such that
(W,≥,R) is a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame and V : Prop→ ℘(W) is a val-
uation satisfying monotonicity with respect to ≥, that is, w ∈ V(p) and w ≥ v imply
v ∈ V(p).
Definition 3.2 The satisfaction relationM,w  φ between a bi-relation intuition-
istic Kripke model M = (W,≥,R,V), a node w ∈W and a formula φ in the language
of IK is defined inductively as follows:
• M,w  p iff w ∈ V(p)
• M,w 1 ⊥
• M,w  φ∧ψ iffM,w  φ andM,w  ψ
• M,w  φ∨ψ iffM,w  φ orM,w  ψ
• M,w  φ→ ψ iff for all v ∈W such that w ≥ v, ifM,v  φ, thenM,v  ψ
• M,w  ^φ iff there exists v ∈W such that wRv andM,v  φ
• M,w  φ iff for all u,v ∈W such that w ≥ u and uRv, it holds thatM,v  φ
It is easy to show that the ≥-monotonicity extends to arbitrary formulas φ, that is,
Monotonicity: [M,w  φ and w ≥ v] =⇒ M,v  φ.
Every classical modal Kripke model induces a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke
model which we shall call powerset model.
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(F1) (F2)
Figure 2: Conditions (F1) and (F2) in powerset models
Definition 3.3 LetM = (W,R,V) be a classical modal Kripke model. The power-
set modelM◦ induced byM is a quadrupleM◦ = (W◦,⊇,R◦,V◦), where
• W◦ = ℘(W) \ {∅}, i.e. W◦ consists of all nonempty teams X ⊆W
• ⊇ is the superset relation
• XR◦Y iff XRY iff Y ⊆ R(X) and Y ∩R(w) , ∅ for every w ∈ X
• X ∈ V◦(p) iff X ⊆ V(p)
To see that M◦ is indeed a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke model, note that the
superset relation ⊇ is a partial ordering, and the monotonicity of V◦ is immediate.
To verify condition (F1), for any X,X′,Y ∈ W◦ such that X ⊇ X′ and XR◦Y, letting
Y′ = R(X′)∩Y, it is easy to show that Y ⊇ Y′ and X′R◦Y′ (see also Figure 2). Sim-
ilarly, to verify condition (F2), for any X,Y,Y′ ∈ W◦ such that XR◦Y and Y ⊇ Y′,
letting X′ = R−1(Y′)∩X, clearly X ⊇ X′ and X′R◦Y′ (see also Figure 2).
Next, we show that the team-based satisfaction relation with respect to classical
modal Kripke models is equivalent to the single-world-based satisfaction relation
with respect to the associated powerset models.
Lemma 3.4 Let M = (W,R,V) be a classical modal Kripke model and X ⊆ W a
nonempty team. For any MID−-formula φ,M,X |= φ ⇐⇒ M◦,X  φ.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on φ. The only interesting case is when
φ = ψ. IfM◦,X  ψ, thenM◦,R(X)  ψ, since X ⊇ X and XR◦R(X). The induction
hypothesis implies thatM,R(X) |= ψ. HenceM,X |= ψ.
Conversely, ifM,X |= ψ, thenM,R(X) |= ψ. For all Y,Z ∈W◦ such that X ⊇ Y and
YR◦Z, since Z ⊆ R(X), the downward closure property implies thatM,Z |= ψ yielding
M◦,Z  ψ by the induction hypothesis. HenceM◦,X  ψ. ♣
Inquisitive logic (being the propositional fragment of MID−) is shown in [3] to be
complete with respect to negative saturated (single-relation) intuitionistic Kripke
models, which are also negative KP-models. Let us now give the corresponding
definitions in the context of bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models.
A point w in a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke modelM = (W,≥,R,V) is called an
≥-endpoint iff there is no point v , w such that w ≥ v. Denote by Ew the set of all
≥-endpoints seen from w, i.e.,
Ew = {v ∈W | w ≥ v and v is an ≥-endpoint}.
A bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame F = (W,≥,R) is said to be ≥-saturated
if for every w ∈ W, Ew , ∅, and for every nonempty subset E ⊆ Ew, there ex-
ists a point v ∈ W such that w ≥ v and Ev = E. A model M is called nega-
tive if M,w  p ⇐⇒ M,w  ¬¬p. It is easy to verify that a powerset model
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Figure 3: Condition (G1’)
M◦ = (W◦,⊇,R◦,V◦) is a negative ≥-saturated model, and in particular, ⊇-endpoints
inM◦ are singletons {w} of elements w inW.
The system of MID− (see Definition 2.3) extends the systems of IK and InqL
with two extra axioms: (φ∨ψ) → (φ∨ψ) and ¬α → ^¬α, where α is any
classical formula. The latter axiom is equivalent to the axiom ¬¬p→ ^¬¬p, be-
cause a classical formula α is always equivalent to a (double) negation ¬¬α (by
Theorem 2.15). In what follows we show that the axioms (p∨ q) → (p∨q)
and ¬¬p → ^¬¬p both characterize certain frame condition. We write R1 ◦R2
for the composition of the two binary relations R1 and R2 on a set W, defined as
(x,y) ∈ R1 ◦R2 iff ∃z ∈W(xR1z∧ zR2y).
Lemma 3.5 Let F = (W,≥,R) be a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame. Then,
F |= (p∨q)→ (p∨q) ⇐⇒ F satisfies condition (G1’) defined below :
G1’: For all w,u,v ∈ W, if u,v ∈ (≥ ◦R)(w), then there exists t ∈ W such that
w(≥ ◦R)t, t ≥ u and t ≥ v. (See Figure 3(a))
Before we give the proof of the lemma, let us first check that the underlying frames
of powerset models satisfy (G1’). First note that for any points X,Y in a powerset
model M◦ = (W◦,⊇,R◦,V◦), X(⊇ ◦R◦)Y iff Y ⊆ R(X). Now, for any three points
w,u,v in W◦ such that u,v ∈⊇ ◦R◦(w), we have u,v ⊆ R(w) implying u∪ v ⊆ R(w).
Clearly, t = u∪ v is a nonempty subset of W such that w(⊇ ◦R◦)t, t ⊇ u and t ⊇ v
(see Figure 3(b)). As a powerset model M◦ carries the information of teams in the
model M, condition (G1’) can be viewed as a property that is abstracted from the
corresponding property of teams of the usual classical modal Kripke frames.
In the sequel, we will also work with the following equivalent form (G1) of (G1’):
G1: For any w ∈ W and any nonempty finite set X ⊆ (≥ ◦R)(w), there exists a
node u ∈ (≥ ◦R)(w) such that u ≥ v for all v ∈ X.
Proof of Lemma 3.5 Suppose F satisfies (G1’) and (F,V),w 1 p∨q for some
valuation V and some w ∈W. Then there exist u,v ∈W such that w(≥ ◦R)u,w(≥ ◦R)v,
(F,V),u 1 p and (F,V),v 1 q.
Let t ∈ W be the point given by (G1’). Then by the ≥-monotonicity, we have
(F,V), t 1 p∨q, which implies that (F,V),w 1 (p∨q).
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Conversely, suppose that F does not satisfy (G1’). Then there exist w,u,v ∈ W
such that w(≥ ◦R)u, w(≥ ◦R)v and for all t ∈W such that w ≥ ◦Rt, either t  u or t  v.
Clearly, we can find a ≥-monotone valuation V such that
V(p) =W\ ≥−1 (v) and V(q) =W\ ≥−1 (u).
For each t ∈ W such that w(≥ ◦R)t, either t <≥−1 (v) or t <≥−1 (u). Thus
(F,V), t  p ∨ q, thereby (F,V),w  (p ∨ q). On the other hand, (F,V),u 1 q
and (F,V),v 1 p. Hence (F,V),w 1 p∨q. ♣
Lemma 3.6 Let F = (W,≥,R) be a ≥-saturated bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke
frame. Then, F |= ¬¬p→^¬¬p ⇐⇒ F satisfies condition (G2) defined below :
G2: Let w ∈ W be an arbitrary point and E a set of ≥-endpoints such that
E ⊆ R(Ew) and E ∩R(v) , ∅ for every v ∈ Ew. Then, there exists t ∈W such
that wRt and Et ⊆ E. (see Figure 4(a))
Before we give the proof of the lemma, let us first check that the underlying frames
of powerset models satisfy (G2). Indeed, for any point w in a powerset model
M◦ = (W◦,⊇,R◦,V◦) and any set E of ⊇-endpoints (i.e., a set of singletons of ele-
ments in W) such that E ⊆ R◦(Ew) and E ∩R◦(v) for every v ∈ Ew, it is easy to see
that t =
⋃
E is a nonempty subset ofW such that wR◦t and Et = E (see Figure 4(b)).
Proof of Lemma 3.6 Suppose F satisfies (G2) and (F,V),w  ¬¬p for some val-
uation V and some w ∈ W. Then, (F,V),v 1 ¬p for each ≥-endpoint v ≥ w, i.e.,
each v ∈ Ew. It follows that there exists u′v such that vRu
′
v and (F,V),u
′
v 1 ¬p, which
implies (F,V),uv  p for some uv ≤ u′v. Since F is ≥-saturated, uv sees an ≥-endpoint,
and thus we may w.l.o.g. assume that uv is itself an ≥-endpoint.
Consider the set E = {uv | v ∈ Ew}. For each uv ∈ E, by the construction we have
v ∈ Ew and vRu′v ≥ uv, which by (F2) implies that there exists v
′ ∈ W such that
v ≥ v′Ruv. But as v is an ≥-endpoint, we must have v = v′ and vRuv. Thus, we
have proved that the set E satisfies the condition E ⊆ R(Ew) in (G2). On the other
hand, for every v ∈ Ew, we have uv ∈ E by definition, and the same argument as above
shows that uv ∈ R(v). Hence, uv ∈ E∩R(v) , ∅, namely E also satisfies the other con-
dition in (G2). Then, (G2) applies to the set E and the point w, and therefore there
exists a point t ∈W such that wRt and Et ⊆ E.
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Now, since Et ⊆ E, every ≥-endpoint that t can see is a uv ∈ E with (F,V),uv  p
for some v ∈ Ew. This means (F,V), t  ¬¬p, which gives (F,V),w  ^¬¬p as wRt.
Conversely, suppose F does not satisfy (G2). Then there exists w ∈W and a set E
of ≥-endpoints satisfying E ⊆R(Ew) and E∩R(v), ∅ for every v ∈ Ew such that for all
t ∈W, wRt implies Et * E. Since E is a set of≥-endpoints, one can find a ≥-monotone
valuation V such that V(p) = E. We will show that (F,V),w 1 ¬¬p→ ^¬¬p.
For every v ∈ Ew, there exists u ∈ E ∩ R(v) , ∅ with (F,V),u  p. Since
(F,V),u 1 ¬p and vRu, we obtain (F,V),v 1 ¬p for every v ∈ Ew. Hence,
(F,V),w  ¬¬p.
On the other hand, for every t ∈ R(w), by the assumption there exists s ∈ Et such
that s < E meaning (F,V), s 1 p. It follows that (F,V), t 1 ¬¬p for every t ∈ R(w).
Hence (F,V),w 1 ^¬¬p. ♣
Let M be the class of all finite negative ≥-saturated bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke
models satisfying (G1) and (G2). In the remainder of this section, we show that the
system of MID− is complete with respect to M, that is, we will prove the following
theorem. The idea of the proof is inspired by that of Theorem 3.2.18 in [3]. Note
that since MID− is not closed under uniform substitution, one can only obtain the
completeness theorem in the sense of the theorem below for a class M of models
(with restricted valuations) instead of a class of frames (with arbitrary valuations).
Theorem 3.7 For any MID−-formula φ, ⊢MID− φ ⇐⇒ M  φ.
Proof of “⇐=” We have checked that each (finite) powerset model is in M. Then,
M  φ =⇒ M◦  φ for all finite powerset modelsM◦
=⇒ M |= φ for all finite classical modal Kripke modelsM (by Lemma 3.4)
=⇒ ⊢MID− φ (by the finite model property (Theorem 2.17) and
the Completeness Theorem of MID−).
p
To prove the other direction “=⇒” of the above theorem, we first show that every
model in M can be mapped via a p-morphism into a finite powerset Kripke model.
As p-morphisms are truth-preserving, the required result will then follow. Now, we
recall the definition of p-morphisms of bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models given
by Wolter and Zakharyaschev in [30].
Definition 3.8 LetM1 = (W1,≥1,R1,V1) andM2 = (W2,≥2,R2,V2) be bi-relation
intuitionistic Kripke models. A function f :W1 →W2 is called a p-morphism iff
P1: w ∈ V1(p)⇐⇒ f (w) ∈ V2(p) for all propositional variables p
P2: w ≥1 v =⇒ f (w) ≥2 f (v)
P3: wR1v =⇒ f (w)R2 f (v)
P4: f (w) ≥2 v′ =⇒ ∃v ∈W1 s.t. f (v) = v′ and w ≥1 v
P5: f (w)R2v′ =⇒ ∃v ∈W1 s.t. v′ ≥2 f (v) and wR1v
P6: f (w)(≥2 ◦R2)v′ =⇒ ∃v ∈W1 s.t. w ≥1 ◦R1v and f (v) ≥2 v′
Theorem 3.9 (see [30]) If f :M1 →M2 is a p-morphism between two bi-relation
intuitionistic Kripke modelsM1 andM2, thenM1,w  φ⇐⇒M2, f (w)  φ.
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Lemma 3.10 For every finite bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke modelM= (W,≥,R,V)
in M, there exists a finite classical modal Kripke model N such that there exists a
p-morphism f ofM into the powerset model N◦ induced by N.
Proof Define a modal Kripke model N = (W0,R0,V0) as follows:
• W0 is the set of all ≥-endpoints ofW,
• R0 = R ↾W0 and V0 = V ↾W0.
Now, consider the powerset Kripke model N◦ = (W◦0 ,⊇,R
◦
0,V
◦
0 ) associated with N.
Define a function f :W →W◦0 by taking
f (w) = Ew for all w ∈W.
SinceM is saturated, Ew , ∅ for all w ∈W. Thus Ew ∈W◦0 and f is well-defined.
Note that an ≥-endpoint e of M is mapped through f to the singleton {e} = Ee.
Intuitively, ≥-endpoints ofM are simulated in our argument by singletons of N◦, and
it may be helpful for the reader to think of a node w ofM as the team formed by all
≥-endpoints seen from w, namely the set Ew.
Now, we proceed to show that f is a p-morphism, i.e., f satisfies (P1)-(P6).
(P1). It suffices to show that M,w  p ⇐⇒ N◦,Ew  p. The direction “=⇒”
follows from the ≥-monotonicity of V . For the direction “⇐=”, if M,w 1 p, then
since V is negative,M,w 1 ¬¬p. Thus, there exists v ∈ Ew such thatM,v 1 p, which
implies that N, {v} 6|= p, thereby N◦,Ew 1 p.
(P2). Clearly, if w ≥ v, then Ew ⊇ Ev, i.e. f (w) ⊇ f (v).
(P3). Assume wRv, we show that EwR◦0Ev, namely EwR0Ev. For any s ∈ Ew, by
(F1) ofM, there exists t ∈W such that v ≥ t and sRt. For each t′ ∈ Ev such that t ≥ t′,
by (F2), there exists s′ ∈W such that s ≥ s′ and s′Rt′. As s is an ≥-endpoint, we must
have s = s′ and sRt′.
On the other hand, for any t ∈ Ev, consecutively applying (F2) and (F1) ofM, by
a similar argument to the above, we can find an s′ ∈ Ew such that s′Rt. Hence, we
conclude that EwR0Ev.
(P4). If Ew ⊇ v′, then asM is ≥-saturated, there exists v ∈W such that w ≥ v and
Ev = v
′, as required.
(P5). If EwR◦0v
′, then EwR0v′. Clearly, v′ is a set of ≥-endpoints such that
v′ ⊆ R(Ew) and v′ ∩R(s) , ∅ for every s ∈ Ew. Thus, by (G2) of M, there exists
v ∈W such that wRv and v′ ⊇ Ev, as required.
(P6) Suppose Ew(⊇ ◦R◦0)u
′ and u′ , ∅. Then u′ ⊆ (≥ ◦R)(w). Since M is fi-
nite, the set u′ must be finite and (G1) applies. Thus, there exists u ∈ W such that
w(≥ ◦R)u and u ≥ s for all s ∈ u′. Since u′ is a set of ≥-endpoints, the latter of the
above implies that f (u) = Eu ⊇ u′. ♣
Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem 3.7 as follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.7, the direction “=⇒” Suppose ⊢MID− φ. For each M ∈ M,
by Lemma 3.10, there is a classical modal Kripke model N and a p-morphism
f :M→N◦. By the assumption, we haveN |= φ, which impliesN◦  φ by Lemma 3.4.
Finally, by Theorem 3.9, we conclude thatM  φ, as required. ♣
Note that the finiteness of the models in the class M is used in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.7 (only) for establishing condition (P6) in Lemma 3.10 when quoting condi-
tion (G1), the frame condition that the axiom (p∨ q)→ (p∨q) characterizes
(see Lemma 3.5). Consider a stronger version of (G1) :
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G1+: For any w ∈W and any nonempty set X ⊆ (≥ ◦R)(w), there exists a node
u ∈ (≥ ◦R)(w) such that u ≥ v for all v ∈ X.
If one, instead, defines M as the class of all (possibly infinite) negative ≥-saturated
bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models satisfying (G1+) and (G2), Theorem 3.7 will
still hold. But we choose to adopt the current setting in this section, as it exhibits
more interaction between the properties of the models and the axioms.
3.2 A single-world semantics for MT−
0
In this section, we define a single-world
semantics for the system of the dependence atom-free fragment of MT0 (MT−0 ), and
prove that MT−
0
is complete (in the single-world semantics sense) with respect to a
class of tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke models.
The language of MT−
0
has one connective more than that of MID. The team se-
mantics of the one additional connective of MT−
0
, the tensor ⊗, is generalized natu-
rally from the usual single-world semantics of the disjunction of classical logic. Yet,
the tensor, being understood as a disjunction, has a few odd behaviors. For instance,
it does not admit the usual elimination and distributive rules for disjunction, in partic-
ular, none of φ⊗φ |= φ, (φ⊗ψ)∧(φ⊗χ) |= φ⊗(ψ∧χ) and (φ∧ψ)⊗(φ∧χ) |= φ∧(ψ⊗χ)
is in general true. Indeed, although the tensor behaves truly as a disjunction over
classical formulas (Cf. Lemma 2.7), Abramsky and Väänänen [1] observed that
the tensor should rather be understood as a multiplicative conjunction (hence the
notation ⊗) as in linear logic (or, in fact, in bunched implication logic [21]). Multi-
plicative conjunction can often be read as a binary diamond modality, and this is the
interpretation that we will adopt for tensor in this section.
Following the approach of the previous section, we first show that the team se-
mantics of MT−
0
over the usual classical modal Kripke models coincides with the
single-world semantics of MT−
0
over the associated full powerset models, which are
powerset models equipped also with a ternary relation R⊗ for the interpretation of
the binary diamond ⊗, and have also the empty team in their domains in order to
characterize the property that the constant ⊥ is the neutral element of the tensor, i.e.,
⊥⊗φ ≡ φ. Let us now define formally this stronger notion of powerset model.
Definition 3.11 Let M = (W,R,V) be a classical modal Kripke model. The full
powerset modelM• induced byM is a quintupleM• = (W•,⊇,R◦,R⊗,V◦), where
• W• = ℘(W) i.e.,W consists of all teams X ⊆W including the empty team ∅
• R⊗ is a ternary relation defined as R⊗(X,Y,Z) iff X = Y ∪Z
• and the other components are defined as in Definition 3.3.
Full powerset models are special cases of tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke models
defined as follows.
Definition 3.12 A tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame is a quardruple
F = (W,≥,R,S ), where (W,≥,R) is a bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame and
S is a binary relation onW satisfying condition (H1) defined below:
H1: If S (w,u,v) and w ≥ w′, then there exist u′,v′ ∈ W such that S (w′,u′,v′),
u ≥ u′ and v ≥ v′.
A tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke model is a tuple (F,V) such that F is a tri-relation
intuitionistic Kripke frame and V satisfies ≥-monotonicity.
Definition 3.13 Let M = (W,≥,R,S ,V) be a tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke
model. We define the satisfaction relationM,w • φ inductively as follows:
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• M,w • ⊥ iff w is an ≥-endpoint
• M,w • ⊗(φ,ψ) iff there exist v,u ∈ W such that S (w,v,u), M,v • φ and
M,u • ψ
• The other cases are defined the same way as the  relation in Definition 3.2.
Note that under the above definition the constant ⊥ does not any more behave as
the falsum of the logic (which is satisfied nowhere in any model) and the semantics
of the negation ¬φ = φ→⊥ is changed accordingly. The real falsum, denoted by 0,
will not be studied in the present paper.
Observe that condition (H1) in Definition 3.12 characterizes a similar type of
interaction between S and ≥ to the interaction between R and ≥ that is characterized
by condition (F1) in Definition 3.1. Condition (F1) ensures the monotonicity of the
(unary) diamond ^. We now prove that the binary diamond ⊗ as well as ⊥ preserve
monotonicity by applying (H1).
Lemma 3.14 (Monontonicity) IfM,w • φ and w ≥ u, thenM,u • φ.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on φ. We only check the interesting cases.
If φ = ⊥, then M,w • ⊥ implies that w is an ≥-endpoint. If w ≥ u, then w = u,
and soM,u • ⊥.
If φ = ψ⊗χ, thenM,w • ψ⊗χ implies that there exist s, t ∈W such that S (w, s, t),
M, s • ψ and M, t • χ. Since w ≥ u, by (H1), there exist s′, t′ ∈ W such that
S (u, s′, t′), s ≥ s′ and t ≥ t′. By the induction hypothesis, we have M, s′ • ψ and
M, t′ • χ. Thus,M,u • ψ⊗χ. ♣
Lemma 3.15 Let M = (W,R,V) be a classical modal Kripke model and X ⊆W a
team. For any MT−
0
-formula φ,M,X |= φ ⇐⇒ M•,X • φ.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on φ. If φ = ⊥, then M,X |= ⊥ iff X = ∅
iffM•,X • ⊥, since ∅ is an ⊇-endpoint inM•.
If φ = ψ⊗χ, then
M,X |= ψ⊗χ ⇐⇒ ∃Y,Z s.t. X = Y ∪Z, M,Y |= ψ andM,Z |= χ
⇐⇒ ∃Y,Z s.t. R⊗(X,Y,Z), M•,Y • ψ andM•,Z • χ
(by the induction hypothesis)
⇐⇒ M•,X • ψ⊗χ.
The other cases follow from the same argument as in Lemma 3.4. ♣
We remarked in the previous section that singletons in a powerset model correspond
to ≥-endpoints in its associated bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models. In a tri-
relation intuitionistic Kripke model M = (W,≥,R,S ,V), singletons are simulated by
the ≥-second least points instead, i.e., points w inW such that there is an ≥-endpoint
e such that w > e, and for all v ∈W, w > v implies that v is an ≥-endpoint. We denote
by E•w the set of all ≥-second least points seen from w, i.e.,
E•w = {v ∈W | w ≥ v and v is a ≥-second least point}.
In particular, if w is an ≥-endpoint, then E•w = ∅; and if w is itself a ≥-second least
point, then E•w = {w}.
We say that a tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke frame F = (W,≥,R,S ) is weakly ≥-
saturated if E•w , ∅ for every non-≥-endpoint w ∈W, and for every subset E ⊆ E
•
w,
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there exists a point v ∈W such that w ≥ v and E•v = E. A modelM is called weakly
negative ifM,w • p ⇐⇒ M,w • ¬¬p, and for all ≥-endpoints e,M,e • p.
Let M• be the class of all finite weakly negative and weakly ≥-saturated tri-
relation intuitionistic Kripke models satisfying (G1), (G2) with “≥-endpoints” and
“Ew” in the definition replaced by “≥-second least points” and “E•w", respectively,
and (H2), (H3) and (H4) defined as follows:
H2: S (w,u,v) ⇐⇒ E•w = E
•
u ∪E
•
v .
H3: For any ≥-endpoint e, eRw or wRe implies that w is also an ≥-endpoint.
H4: eRe for all ≥-endpoints e
A full powerset modelM• has a unique⊇-endpoint, namely the empty set ∅. Since
M,∅ |= p for all p, by Lemma 3.4 we know thatM•,∅ • p as well. We leave it for the
reader to verify that all the other conditions of M• are satisfied by the full powerset
modelM• of any finite modal Kripke modelM, i.e.,M• ∈M•.
The main result of this section is that the system of MT−
0
is complete with respect
to the class M•, namely, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.16 For any MT−
0
-formula φ, ⊢MT−
0
φ ⇐⇒ M•  φ.
The proof of the above theorem goes through a similar argument to that of Theo-
rem 3.7. The direction “⇐=" follows from Lemma 3.15 and the finite model property
of MT−
0
(Theorem 2.17). The other direction “=⇒" will follow from Theorem 3.19
and Lemma 3.20 to be stated and proved in the remainder of this section.
We first prove a lemma concerning the behavior of the double negation under the
satisfaction relation •.
Lemma 3.17 LetM = (W,≥,R,S ,V) be a model inM• and w is a non-≥-endpoint
inM. Then,M,w 1• ¬¬p iffM,v 1• p for some v ∈ E•w.
Proof “⇐=": SupposeM,v 1• p for some v ∈ E•w. For any point e such that v ≥ e
and v , e, e is an ≥-endpoint, implying M,e • ⊥. It follows that M,v • p→ ⊥.
SinceM,v 1• ⊥, we concludeM,w 1• (p→⊥)→⊥.
“=⇒”: SupposeM,w 1• ¬¬p. Then, there exists u ≤ w such that M,u • p→⊥
and M,u 1• ⊥. The latter implies that u is not an ≥-endpoint. Since M is weakly
≥-saturated, E•u , ∅. Pick an element v ∈ E
•
u ⊆ E
•
w. By the monotonicity of ≥, we
haveM,v • p→⊥, implyingM,v 1• p, as required. ♣
The notion of p-morphism for tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke models is the p-
morphism for bi-relation intuitionistic Kripke models parametrized by the standard
clause for binary diamonds.
Definition 3.18 LetM1 = (W1,≥1,R1,S 1,V1) andM2 = (W2,≥2,R2,S 2,V2) be tri-
relation intuitionistic Kripke models. A function f :W1 →W2 is called a p-morphism
iff f satisfies (P1)-(P6) and (Q1) and (Q2) defined below:
Q1: S 1(w,u.v) =⇒ S 2( f (w), f (u), f (v))
Q2: S 2( f (w),u′,v′) =⇒ ∃u,v ∈W1 s.t. f (u) = u′, f (v) = v′ and S 1(w,u,v)
We call a p-morphism f between twomodelsM1 = (W1,≥1,R1,V1) andM2 = (W2,≥2,R2,V2)
endpoint-preserving if
Q3: e is an ≥1-endpoint ⇐⇒ f (e) is an ≥2-endpoint.
Theorem 3.19 If f is an endpoint-preserving p-morphism between tri-relation
intuitionistic Kripke modelsM1 andM2, thenM1,w 
• φ⇐⇒M2, f (w) • φ.
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Proof The theorem is proved by a routine argument. ♣
Finally, we prove the crucial lemma of this section, from which the direction “=⇒"
of Theorem 3.16 will follow. The reader may compare this lemma with Lemma 3.10.
Lemma 3.20 For every finite tri-relation intuitionistic Kripke model M in M•,
there exists a finite classical modal Kripke modelN such that there exists an endpoint
preserving p-morphism f ofM into the full powerset model N• induced by N.
Proof LetM = (W,≥,R,S ,V). Define a modal Kripke model N = (W0,R0,V0) as:
• W0 is the set of all ≥-second least points ofW,
• R0 = R ↾W0 and V0 = V ↾W0.
Now, consider the full powerset Kripke model N• = (W•0 ,⊇,R
◦
0,R⊗,V
◦
0 ) associated
with N. Define a function f :W →W•0 by taking
f (w) = E•w for all w ∈W.
We show that f is an endpoint-preserving p-morphism. Conditions (P2) and (P4)
are verified by a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 3.10 taking into
account the fact that Ew is replaced by E•w in this proof. We now give the proof for
the other conditions.
(P1). We show that M,w • p ⇐⇒ N•,E•w 
• p. If e is an ≥-endpoint, since M
is weakly negative, M,e • p. We also have E•e = ∅, and N
•,∅ • p by the empty
team property and Lemma 3.15. If w is not an ≥-endpoint, applying Lemma 3.17,
the condition is proved by a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 3.10.
(P3). Assume wRv, we show that E•wR
◦
0E
•
v , namely E
•
wR0E
•
v . If one of w and v
is an ≥-endpoint, then by (H3), both w and v are ≥-endpoints, which implies that
E•w = ∅ = E
•
v . By definition, ∅R0∅, i.e., E
•
wR0E
•
v .
Now, assume that both w and v are not ≥-endpoints. By a similar argument to
that in Lemma 3.10, for any s ∈ E•w, by (F1) of M, there exists t ∈ W such that
v ≥ t and sRt. For each t′ ∈ E•v such that t ≥ t
′, by (F2), there exists s′ ∈ W such
that s ≥ s′ and s′Rt′. But since s is a ≥-second least point, either s′ = s or s′ is an
≥-endpoint. In the latter case, we conclude from (H3) that t′ is also an ≥-endpoint,
which is a contradiction. Thus, the former is the case, and sRt′. On the other hand,
for any t ∈ E•v , by a similar argument, we can find an s
′ ∈ E•w such that s
′Rt. Hence
we conclude that E•wR0E
•
v .
(P5). Suppose E•wR
◦
0v
′. If one of E•w and v
′ is the empty set, then E•w = ∅ = v
′
by the definition of R◦0. Since M is weakly ≥-saturated, w must be an ≥-endpoint,
which by (H4) implies that wRw. Also, clearly, v′ ⊇ ∅ = E•w = f (w), as required. If
E•w,v
′
, ∅, then the condition follows from a similar argument to that in the proof of
Lemma 3.10.
(P6). Suppose E•w(⊇ ◦R
◦
0)v
′. If v′ = ∅, then let v be any ≥-endpoint such that
w ≥ v. Clearly, f (v) = E•v = ∅ ⊇ v
′. By (H4), vRv, and thus w(≥ ◦R)v. If v′ , ∅, then
the condition follows from a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 3.10.
(Q1). Suppose S (w,u,v). By (H2), E•w = E
•
u ∪E
•
v , thereby R⊗( f (w), f (u), f (v)).
(Q2). Suppose R⊗( f (w),u′,v′). Then E•w = u
′∪v′. SinceM is weakly ≥-saturated,
there exist u,v ∈W such that w ≥ u,v, E•u = u
′ and E•v = v
′. It follows that f (u) = u′,
f (v) = v′. Since E•w = E
•
u ∪E
•
v , by (H2), we obtain S (w,u,v).
(Q3). If e is an ≥-endpoint, then f (e) = E•e = ∅, which is the unique ⊇-endpoint
of N•. Conversely, if w is not an ≥-endpoint, then sinceM is weakly ≥-saturated, we
have E•w , ∅, i.e., f (w) is not an ⊇-endpoint. ♣
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the axiomatization problem and some model-theoretic
properties of the major modal dependence logics considered in the literature, namely
MT0, MID, MD∨, MD and MD+. In the first part of the paper, we introduced sound
and complete Hilbert-style or natural deduction systems for all these logics, among
which those logics with intuitionistic implication have not been axiomatized before.
We presented the system of MT0 as an extension of Fischer Servi’s intuitionistic
modal logic IK and the Kreisel-Putnam intermediate logic KP, and the systems of
all the other modal dependence logics are its fragments and variants. We showed that
formulas of all these modal dependence logics (essentially) enjoy a same disjunctive
normal form that is essentially already known in the literature. We also derived some
metalogical properties of the logics, such as Craig’s Interpolation Theorem and the
Finite Model Property, as immediate corollaries of the normal form.
First-order teams are essentially relations in first-order models, and first-order de-
pendence logic is expressively equivalent to existential second-order logic [28, 17].
In a similar fashion, in the second part of the paper we interpreted modal teams as
possible worlds in powerset models in Lemmas 3.4 and 3.15, and on the basis of
this we showed in Theorems 3.7 and 3.16 that MID− and MT−
0
can be understood
as intermediate modal logics also from the model-theoretic perspective in the sense
that they are complete (in the single-world semantics sense) with respect to certain
classes of intuitionistic Kripke models. It is worth pointing out that although Lem-
mas 3.4 and 3.15 are not explicitly found in the literature, their intuitive idea seems
to be folklore in the field or have in some sense already been used as a guideline in
some research. For instance, the perfect information semantic set game introduced in
[29] for modal dependence logic played over modal Kripke models can actually be
viewed as a standard perfect information semantic game played over the associated
full powerset models, and the correctness of the set game is essentially justified by
Lemma 3.15. It is the author’s hope that the connections established in the paper be-
tween team semantics and single-world semantics, and between modal dependence
logics and intermediate modal logics can provide a pointer for a deeper understand-
ing of team semantics and team-based logics.
As acknowledged in the corresponding sections, many results of this paper are
built on or inspired by the literature of inquisitive logic. Inquisitive modal logic
(see e.g. [5]) can be viewed as a variant of model dependence logic with different
modalities. It is interesting to see whether inquisitive modal logic can also be given a
single-world semantics in a similar manner, and to compare inquisitive modal logic
with intermediate modal logics.
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1. The team semantics of an extended dependence atom =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) with α1, . . . ,αk,β
first-order formulas is defined as M |=X =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) iff
for all s, s′ ∈ X : M |=s αi ⇔ M |=s′ αi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k implies M |=s β⇔ M |=s′ β.
This atom can be defined in first-order dependence logic as =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) :=
∀x∀y(x = y)∨∃w1 . . .∃wk∃u∃v0∃v1
(
=(w1, . . . ,wk,u)∧ =(v0)∧ =(v1)∧ (v0 , v1)
∧
k∧
i=1
(
θ(wi,v0,v1)∧δ(wi,αi,v0,v1)
)
∧ θ(u,v0,v1)∧δ(u,β,v0,v1)
)
,
where θ(v,v0,v1) := (v= v0)⊗ (v= v1) and δ(v,γ,v0,v1) :=
(
¬γ⊗ (v= v1)
)
∧
(
γ⊗ (v= v0)
)
.
The defining formula states intuitively that “either the model in question has only one
element in its domain (in which case =(α1, . . . ,αk,β) is trivially satisfied), or the team in
question satisfies =(w1, . . . ,wk,u), where wi simulates αi and u simulates β".
The intuitionistic disjunction can be defined in first-order dependence logic as
φ∨ψ :=
(
∃x∃y(x , y)⊗ (φ⊗ψ)
)
∧
(
∀x∀y(x = y)⊗∃u∃v
(
=(u)∧ =(v)∧ (u , v)∧ ((u = v)⊗φ)∧ ((u , v)⊗ψ)
))
,
where the first conjunct of the defining formula deals with the case when the model has
cardinality 1, and the second conjunct deals with the other cases.
2. The deduction system of MID− is obtained (natrually) from the system of MID, as
defined in Definition 2.3 or in Definition 2.9, by simply dropping all the rules that involve
dependence atoms. Similarly for the deduction system of MT−
0
.
3. In the literature intermediate modal logics are often obtained by adding to intuitionistic
modal logic (either Fischer Servi’s IK or some other versions) extra modal axioms, such
as S4, S5 axioms. The approach we take in this paper is, roughly, to add to IK an extra
propositional axiom, the KP axiom.
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